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Abstract 
 
We present a familiar - yet novel - signaling game where signaling in the labor market has 
an externality affecting the employers' profits. The externality arises due to the appearance 
of a free substitute (negative externalities) or a complement (positive externalities) in the 
product market as a result of the signaling activity. We examine in detail how the outcome 
of the signaling game is affected by the product market externalities and market size. It is 
shown first that in the case negative and mild positive externalities, the least cost 
separating equilibrium is standard. The level of credential, the "good" type will choose in 
order to separate from the "bad" type is lower (higher) with negative (positive) externality 
than in the case when externalities are absent. In contrast to previous literature, we show 
that when the magnitude of positive externalities is high enough, the least cost separating 
equilibrium is rather different in nature: The "good" type will choose the highest rather than 
the lowest possible levels of credential in order to separate from the "bad" type. 
Interestingly, in the case of very strong positive market externalities, the separation of 
workers' types is impossible, and we end up with a pooling equilibrium with maximum 
signaling. Finally, when considering the welfare effects, we show that under certain 
conditions, the private market solution may involve too little signaling compared to social 
optimum. 
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1 Introduction
In this paper we extend Spences (1973) classical work on job market signaling
into a case where the signaling activity has an externality a¤ecting the employ-
ersprots. The externality arises due to the appearance of a free substitute
or a complement in the product market as a result of signaling activity in the
labor market.
Already Spence (1974) discussed the possibility of signaling (education) in-
creasing the labor embodied productivity, but the case where signaling has an
externality e¤ect via the consumer market is, to the best of our knowledge novel
in the literature of signaling. In contrast to Spence we suggest that the poten-
tial e¤ects of signaling are not (just) labor embodied, but instead are coming
through an another channel, namely the product market. Consequently, then
also the notion of a negative externality becomes meaningful and gets a natural
interpretation. Our set up is thus general enough to incorporate both positive
and negative market externalities within a unied framework.
We show that the introduction of product market externalities and market
size e¤ects has non-trivial e¤ects on the outcome of the otherwise standard sig-
naling game. When market externalities are either negative (substitute goods)
or not too strong positive (complementary goods) in the least cost separating
equilibrium the credential level that separates the "good" type from the "bad"
type with negative (positive) externality is lower (higher) than in the case when
externalities are absent. In contrast to previous literature we show that in the
case of moderately strong positive market externalities, the least cost separating
equilibrium is rather di¤erent in nature: the "bad" type chooses zero credential
but the "good" type chooses the highest rather than the lowest possible level
of credential. In the case very strong positive market externalities it turns out
to be impossible to separate the types, and the signaling game has a pooling
equilibrium with the highest possible levels of credential.
Since Spence it has been regarded to be the case that signaling is (almost)
always purely a social waste, since it has no e¤ect on productivity, and its only
purpose is to facilitate separation of types under asymmetric information. In
our set up this is not necessarily true, and most interestingly we can show that
the private market solution may actually involve too little signaling compared
to social optimum.
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To get some perspective for our idea of signaling with externality consider
the following examples that we believe are captured by our model. Take rst
the open source programming where individual programmers get involved with
open source projects in order to signal their programming skills to potential
employers (i.e. commercial software companies). As an outcome of successful
open source programming project the freely available program will appear and
coexist with commercial programs in software markets. This free program may
either be a complement or a substitute to the commercial program.1
Another example of signaling with externality might be academic research,
for example in the pharmaceuticals. Research results of the university labs,
say a new molecule, contribute to the reputation of involved researchers, and
are interpreted by the future (commercial) employers as a credible signal of the
innate skills of researchers. At the same time, these results may either substitute
or complement the potential employers research, and thus ultimately a¤ecting
its market revenue.2 More concretely, the research output could simply be any
good research publication that might compete with or be a complement to a
commercial (text)book of the potential employer interested in hiring the very
person who produced the literary output.
Our third example of internal labor markets is a little bit outside of our main
focus, but it is still fully consistent with the idea of signaling with externality.
Consider a rm where promotion decisions are largely a¤ected by the initiatives
and innovations of current employees, and where the new ideas are regarded
by the owners as credible signals of workers innate abilities. Quite naturally
the new ideas and innovations can be complements or substitutes of those that
form the base of the rms current activities generating the market revenue. As
intellectual property rights of ideas are not well dened, the workers with new
ideas can leave the rm quite easily and start either competing with it in the
1Hann, Roberts and Slaughter (2002) provide empirical evidence of economic incentives
of individual programmers within the Apache web-server open source project. Their results
conrm that a higher status in a merit-based ranking does lead to signicantly higher wages.
A higher status in a merit-based ranking list is a credible signal of the productive capacity
of a programmer, and software companies are willing to pay for high wages for the top per-
formers. In our companion paper, Leppämäki and Mustonen (2004) we examine open source
programming as a possible signaling and screening device.
2Stern (1999) nds that researchers in public employment are willing to accept lower wages.
This he views as an evidence that the workers in public employment value reputation building
opportunities.
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case of substitutes or providing some complementary service.
We carry out the main analysis within a signaling model with three types of
players: workers, rms and consumers, who will interact in two types of mar-
ket: labor markets and product markets. We analyze workers (who di¤er in
their innate ability) signaling and rmshiring and derive the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (PBE) of the signaling game. The focus on our analysis is in exam-
ining how the outcome of the signaling game is a¤ected by the product market
externalities and market size.
We show rst that when externalities are either negative (substitute goods)
or not too strong positive (complementary goods) the analysis of signaling and
the derivation of the least cost separating equilibrium of the signaling game is
standard. Then in the least cost separating equilibrium the credential level that
separates the "good" type from the "bad" type with negative (positive) exter-
nality is lower (higher) than in the case when externalities are absent. Intuitively
these results are due to "intensied competition" in the case of substitutes and
"consumersincreased willingness to pay for the commercial good" in the case
of complements. In the former case, the prots of the rms and thus the wages
are reduced due to the appearance of a free substitute good in the product
market. Consequently then, the worker optimally adjusts the credential level
downwards. In the latter case, the rms prots and thus the wages will go up,
since consumerswillingness to pay for the commercial good has increased due
to the appearance of a free complementary good. Naturally then the worker
optimally adjusts the credential level upwards. It is the interaction between the
commercially produced good and the freely available good in the product mar-
ket, which is reected in the level credential found in the least cost separating
equilibrium of the signaling game. It is also interesting to see that, in our set
up we can replicate the results of Spence (1973) as a benchmark case, when
externalities and market size e¤ects are eliminated.
Secondly, when we consider moderate positive market externalities we show
that the least cost separating equilibrium is rather di¤erent in nature compared
to the cases analyzed previously in the literature. In fact, it turns out that
as usual the "bad" type chooses zero credential, but the "good" type instead
chooses the highest rather than the lowest possible level of credential. Intu-
itively, the reason for this is that the positive market externality e¤ect is so
strong that the increased wage balances o¤ the disutility of attaining any cre-
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dential. Clearly then the "good" type chooses the highest possible credential.
In the case of very strong positive market externalities it turns out to be
impossible to separate types, since now it is benecial even for the "bad" type
to choose the highest possible credential, and eventually we end up with a pool-
ing equilibrium with maximum signaling. Intuitively this is because under the
very strong positive market externalities it becomes more and more di¢ cult to
separate types, as they are in fact becoming closer to each other. The di¤erence
in their productiveness becomes less important compared to the positive market
externality e¤ect.
Interestingly, in our case the signaling activity is not purely a social waste
like in Spences (1973) analysis, since here it will eventually materialize in a free
good that consumers value. Thus our welfare analysis becomes more interesting,
and we show that there is a potential conict of interest between privately and
socially optimal levels of signaling, since individual workers and rms do not
internalize all the benets and costs of signaling that are however valued by the
welfare maximizing social planner. We can outline the precise conditions under
which the private market solution involves too little or too much signaling com-
pared to social optimum. The interesting new nding, of course, is that in the
private market solution there may be underprovision of signaling. In addition,
we show that the social welfare may actually be higher under asymmetric infor-
mation with signaling than in the case of symmetric information, when there is
no reason to signal in the rst place.
It is evident that the papers closest to ours are the classical papers by Spence
(1973, 1974). As already said Spence (1974) considered the possibility of signal-
ing increasing the labor embodied productivity.3 He acknowledged that acquir-
ing education as such may increase the workers productivity. That is, by using
Spences (1974) notation, the innate productivity of good type after attaining
education level y increases from 2 to 2+ y=4: In contrast to Spence, in our set
up the productivity of a worker remains unchanged but the product market,
where the employer operates, is a¤ected via a positive or negative externality
e¤ect as described above. At rst hand, what we are doing (especially in the
case of complements) may look similar to Spence, however the mechanism how
the acquired credential a¤ects the incentives to signal and the equilibrium of
3 In Rileys (1979) informational equilibium analysis sellers can invest in proving the quality
of products they bring into the market.
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the signaling game is drastically di¤erent. In particular, our approach makes it
possible to examine negative externalities and the market size e¤ects. The par-
ticular example of education increasing the labor embodied productivity that
Spence (1974) considered falls safely (on purpose?) into the same category
than our rst case of mild positive externalities when the least cost separating
equilibrium with standard properties holds
Much of the recent contributions of signaling literature are reviewed in a
recent excellent survey by Riley (2001).4 As he puts it since Spences work,
the one line of research on signaling has devoted much of its attention on to
the renements of equilibria in the signaling games within the development of
modern game theory. The other line of research has focused more on applying
the idea of signaling into various economically interesting and important ques-
tions, although as Riley points out some of the applications have advanced the
theory as well. Our contribution here is to introduce a new mechanism for the
signaling to work, and to examine in detail how the outcome of the job market
signaling game is a¤ected by the magnitude of negative and positive product
market externalities and market size.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In next section we present
the model, and the main analysis is carried out in section 3. In section 4 we
examine when does the private market solution involves too much or too little
signaling compared to the social optimum. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
In this section we set up the model and describe the players involved and the
markets where they interact. On purpose, we follow the notation of Spence
(1973, 1974) as closely as possible. We consider a model with three class of
players; workers, employers and consumers who will interact in two markets;
labor markets and product markets.
2.1 Players and Markets
We assume there exists two types of workers, who di¤er only in their non-
veriable ability that is also called as their productivity. We assume that the
4See also Spence (2002).
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high productivity worker (good type) has a productivity of  = 2 and the
low productivity worker (badtype) has a productivity of  = 1. The share of
"goodtypes is assumed to be equal to q1.
In order to separate from each other a worker may attain a credential y,
0  y  ymax. It is assumed that it is easier for the goodtype to acquire a
given credential, and the utilities of the workers are assumed to depend on the
wage, and the disutility of attaining the credential as follows:
UG = w   y
2
; UB = w   y:
In above G refers to good, high productivity type and B to bad, low
productivity type, each attaining credential y and earning the wage w. In this
paper we extend the original analysis of Spence into the case where the activity
of attaining credential y creates as a by-product a good that will be freely
available for consumers. Thus, this free good will interact with the commercially
produced good in the product market.
In our analysis, the employer is a prot maximising monopoly supplying the
commercially produced good in some product market niche. The monopolist
employs a worker with productivity , and produces the commercial good in a
project of size one. We assume that the quality of the commercial good depends
on the workers productivity and without loss of generality it is assumed to be
equal to . The signaling activity, i.e. the e¤ort to acquire a credential y; creates
as a by-product a free good of quality jkjy in the product market.
In our analysis we focus on three cases by dening that for k = 0; the free
available good good is independent of the monopolists market, for k > 0; it is a
complement to the monopolists good, and for k < 0, the freely available good
is an incomplete substitute to the monopolists commercial good.
As shown in the appendix the monopolists revenues in all these three cases
can be expressed conveniently by a single equation:
R =M ( + ky) ;
where M captures the market size e¤ect, and where k may either be positive,
negative or zero. Quite clearly, the case of zero externalities resembles Spences
original analysis, and indeed in section 3 we show this to be true when the
market size e¤ects are eliminated.
For later purposes it is important to notice that even if the revenue functions
are identical in the cases of complement and substitute goods, the market out-
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comes di¤er substantially. For a complement, the same consumers that would
have bought the commercial good anyway are (now due to the appearance of a
free complementary good) willing to pay more of that very good. In the case
of substitutes some consumers buy the commercial good, and the rest of the
consumers acquire the freely available good.
Following tradition, we assume that the worker has all the bargaining power
in the labor market, which implies that the employers will compete for the
workers, and end up with zero prots
 = R  w =M ( + ky)  w = 0:
Timing of the model goes as follows. At the outset nature assigns work-
ersproductiveness and the proportion of high and low productivity workers.
Then a worker may engage himself in attaining a credential y, and thus simul-
taneously creating a free good that is either a complement or substitute to the
commercially produced one. A monopolist hires a worker with credential level
equal to y and pays out wage w: In the case of substitutes, consumers buy the
commercial good or acquire the free good, and in the case of complements, the
consumers are willing to pay more for the commercial good. At the end prots
are realized and wages are paid out.
2.2 The Strategies and Solution Concept
In the labor market, strategies (yB ; yG; w
) and a system of beliefs  form the
perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). The building block for the equilibrium is
the assumption that the attained credential is regarded by rms as a credible
signal of a workers innate ability. We assume that each worker chooses the level
of credential given the wage function w(; y) = M( + ky). The bad type
faces a problem
yB 2 argmax
y
[w(1; y)  y];
and the goodtypes problem is
yG 2 argmax
y
[w(2; y)  y
2
]:
The rm hires a worker with a credential y at wage
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w(; y) = (1 j y)M (1 + kyB) + (1  (1 j y))M (2 + kyG) (1)
with beliefs  that are consistent with equilibrium strategies yB ; yG:In par-
ticular, if the optimal credential levels di¤er, yB 6= yG; then if observed y =
yB ; 
(1 j y) = 1 and if one observes y = yG; (1 j y) = 0: Of course, in
the case when the optimal credential levels coincide, yB = yG; then if observed
credential y = yB = yG; 
(1 j y) = 1  q1:
Since the predictive power of PBE is weak in a sense that it does not restrain
the out of equilibrium beliefs, in the rest of the paper we use the Cho-Kreps
(1987) intuitive criterion, and focus on the least cost separating equilibrium
when feasible.
3 The Analysis
3.1 The Case of Substitutes and Mild Positive Externali-
ties
We consider next the optimal behavior of workers in the labor market and
demonstrate the implications of market externalities for the signaling activity.
When individual workers decide on the level of credential they acquire in order to
signal their capability, they anticipate the wage o¤er of the potential employers.
That is, they choose the optimal credential levels yG and yB by maximizing
their utilities UG and UB given the wage function (1)
The incentive compatibility constraints for badand goodtypes read as
M (1 + kyB)  yB M (2 + kyG)  yG; (2)
M (2 + kyG)  yG
2
M (1 + kyB)  yB
2
: (3)
From now on we consider the case when the magnitude of externalities k 2
( 1 < k  12M ): That is, we allow the possibility of negative externalities (i.e.
substitute goods) and not too strong positive externalities. In the next section,
we in turn focus on the case of stronger positive market externalities k > 12M
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i.e. when the freely available good is a very strong (valuable) complement to
the commercial good.
It turns out that in the former case we can use the standard methods to
derive the equilibrium that has the usual properties.5 As we are focusing on
the least cost separating equilibrium, yB 6= yG and since getting a credential
is costly, it is optimal for the "bad" type not to get one, since dUBdy < 0 for
 1 < k  12M
yB = 0:
The "good" type chooses the lowest level of credential that allows him to
separate from the "bad" type. That is simply due to the fact that dUGdy  0
for  1 < k  12M . The level of credential the "good" type will choose can be
solved from the "bad" types binding IC -constraint (2)
yG =
M
1 Mk:
Consequently the wages are wB = M , w

G = M

2 + k M1 Mk

: In the least
cost separating equilibrium, the utilities of the workers are
UB =M;
UG = 2M +
(2kM   1)M
2 (1 Mk) :
As we have now derived the least cost credential levels, we state the following
result with regard to the market externality:
Proposition 1 The least-cost credential level that separates the "good" type
from the "bad" type with negative (positive) externality is lower (higher) than
in the case when externalities are absent, ysG < y
i
G < y
c
G:
Proof. It is enough to notice that in the case of substitutes(k < 0), ysG =
M
1 Mk is smaller than than y
i
G = M in the case of independent goods (k = 0),
5The best of our knowledge in the literature of signaling the papers have focused so far
solely on cases where the least cost separating equilibrium always implies the lowest possible
levels of signaling that allows separation of types. See e.g. Riley (2001).
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which in turn is smaller than ycG =
M
1 Mk in the case of complements (k > 0):
Intuition for the result is straightforward. When the signaling activity cre-
ates a substitute good to the monopolists commercial good, the high produc-
tivity type su¤ers from this: The intensied competition in the product market
lowers the monopolists prots and thus the wage the "good" type receives once
hired by the rm. The worker fully internalizes the negative externality e¤ect
and optimally adjusts the credential level downwards. In the case of comple-
mentary goods the worker in turn adjusts the credential level upwards.
In previous section we claimed that when externalities and market size e¤ects
are absent our analysis reproduces the results of Spence. To see this formally,
let us assume for a moment that externalities are absent i.e. that k = 0, and
that the market size e¤ects are normalized to M = 1. In this benchmark case,
the least cost separating equilibrium has exactly the same features as in Spence
(1973, 1974):
Corollary 2 In the absence of product market externalities and market size
e¤ects, our results coincide with those of Spence (1973, 1974): yB = 0, yG = 1,
UB = 1 and UG = 32 :
Proof. Just plug in k = 0 and M = 1 into expressions of yG; UB ;and UG,
and the results will follow immediately.
The results of Proposition 1 seem to imply that there may be a conict of
interest between privately and socially optimal levels of signaling. In the case
of substitutes the worker does not take into account the benets that accrue to
the consumers who have an access for the freely available good. Interestingly, in
the case of complementary goods the worker does internalize some but not all
of the realized benets. The magnitude of conict of interest seems to depend
on the underlying market structure. Well come back to this issue in section 4
where we focus on the welfare e¤ects.
We also nd that the level of credential the "good" type has to choose in
order to signal his capability in the least cost separating equilibrium increases in
the magnitude of market externality. This, of course, is reected in his utility,
and we have the following result:
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Corollary 3 The "good" types utility in the case of complementary goods is
higher than in the case of substitute goods.
Proof. This is clear, since @UG@k > 0:
Although quite simple and straightforward, the above result has interesting
economic implications. Namely, given that the worker can decide how to allocate
his attention in terms of attaining credential it is clear that he will devote
attention towards the signaling activity that will produce as by-product a free
complementary good. More generally, this of course implies that one should
observe signaling activity occurring more often in such areas where the outcome
of the signaling activity has some complementariness with the commercially
produced goods. Clearly this is an interesting empirical question that, of course,
is beyond the current paper, and thus left for future research.
3.2 The Case of Strong Positive Externalities
Above we assumed that the magnitude of market externalities was bounded
from above. How does our analysis extend into the cases where positive market
externalities are far more stronger i.e. when the goods become more and more
valuable complements? It is useful to examine the e¤ects of stronger external-
ities in two steps. First, we analyze the case when the positive externalities
are moderately strong, 12M < k <
1
M ; and show that there exists a least cost
separating equilibrium where the "bad" type chooses zero credential and the
"good" type chooses the maximum credential. Finally, we consider very strong
positive market externalities, k  1M ; and show that then the separation of
types is impossible, and we have a (unique) pooling equilibrium with maximum
credential levels.
Once the positive market externalities are moderately strong, the incentive
problem of the "bad" type remains the same, and since dUBdy < 0 for  1 <
k  1M he prefers to choose yB = 0; and receives wB = M: In fact, the "bad"
types IC constraint is not binding any more, since the "good" type will choose
now even a higher credential level than before. That is, now the "bad" type is
strictly better o¤ with choosing yB = 0 than the credential level that will be
chosen by the "good" type.
Interestingly, the situation with the "good" type changes compared to the
case of the previous section. In the least cost separating equilibrium he will
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not any more prefer to choose the lowest level of credential in order to separate
from the "bad" type. Rather, he chooses the highest possible amount ymax,
since dUGdy > 0 for k >
1
2M . In essence, this means that the positive market
externality e¤ect is so strong that the increased wage balances o¤ the disutility
of attaining any credential y. Clearly then the "good" type chooses as high y
as possible. In other words, there is no upper limit for y, and in equilibrium the
"good" type sets yG = ymax, and thus we have the following result:
Proposition 4 In the case of complementary goods with moderately strong ex-
ternalities, 12M < k <
1
M ; we have a least cost separating equilibrium with
yB = 0 and yG = ymax:
Proof. Given y = 0 has been observed the monopolist updates beliefs
(1 j 0) = 1, and if the observed y = ymax;then (1 j 0) = 0:Given these
equilibrium beliefs, the wage function is
w(; y) = (1 j y)M + (1  (1 j y))M (2 + kymax) :
Given the wage function it is optimal for the "bad" type to choose y = 0; since
M > M(2 + kymax)  ymax for 8 12M < k < 1M : That is, he is strictly better
of by choosing yB = 0 and receiving M instead of choosing ymax and receiving
the higher wage M(2 + kymax), since we know that ymax > M1 Mk : From above,
we already know that the "good" type prefers to set yG = ymax receiving then
M (2 + kymax)  ymax instead of getting only M by choosing zero credential for
8 12M < k < 1M :
Let us now move to the case of very strong positive market externalities
k  1M : For the "good" type the analysis remains as above, since now it is
even more benecial for him to choose as high y as possible, and thus he sets
yG = ymax: Interestingly, now even for the "bad" type, the positive market
externality e¤ect is strong enough that the increased wage balances o¤ the
disutility of attaining any credential y: Consequently, the "bad" type prefers to
mimic the "good" type, and sets yB = ymax, since
dUB
dy > 0 for 8 k > 1M : Thus
we have to consider the possibility of pooling equilibrium where yB = yG = ymax
and the expected wage is equal to (1   q1)M (1 + kymax) + q1M (2 + kymax) :
Thus we have a pooling equilibrium with maximum signaling:
Proposition 5 In the case of complementary goods with very strong market
externalities, k  1M , we have a pooling equilibrium with maximum signaling
yB = yG = ymax:
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Proof. We prove our claim with k = 1M : If the main result will hold then
it will be true for any k > 1M as well. After plugging in k in the wage function
we have w(; y) =M(1 + q1) + ymax: Given that yB = yG = ymax it is enough
to consider downward deviations. The "bad" types IC constraint reduces to
M(1 + q1) > M: That is, on the LHS we have the utility under the pooling
contract, and on the RHS the utility of the "bad" type in the case when he
would choose deviate by choosing y < ymax in which case the monopolist would
update the beliefs that the worker is the "bad" type, and would set wage equal
to M + y: Similarly the "good" type has no incentives to deviate from ymax
either, since by deviating downwards he would get M + y2 which is always lower
than M(1 + q1) +
ymax
2 he gets under the pooling contract, since y < ymax.
Another way to understand the result is to think some chosen credential ey <
ymax; and the consider this ey as a potential pooling equilibrium. When trying to
apply for this potential pooling equilibrium the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion we
see immediately that in contrast to the normal case (of zero externality), now
actually both types would like to deviate from ey upwards, say up to anotherby. In short, this means that IC constraint is not binding for neither types. By
using again the intuitive criterion for by we see that the same thing happens; also
now both types prefer to deviate upwards. Ultimately one ends up to ymax, and
from there neither type prefers to deviate (downwards).6
Intuition for the e¤ects of very strong positive market externalities is rather
straightforward. Once k increases it becomes more and more protable to signal,
and the market externality e¤ect dominates the disutility of attaining credential
even for the "bad" type. The key thing is that it becomes more and more
di¢ cult to separate types, as they are in fact becoming closer to each other
when k increases; the di¤erence in their productiveness becomes less important
compared to the market e¤ect of signaling.
Finally, it is useful to notice that it is actually a combination of some critical
values of jkj andM that determine to which type of equilibrium we end up. For
instance, for very large markets (i.e. highM) even relatively low level of positive
market externality (i.e. low k) is enough to destroy the least cost separating
6Notice that the above result would be valid even if we had assumed that there is no upper
limit for y. All that matters for our result is that both types would prefer to choose as high
y as possible since dUi
dy
> 0 for 8 k > 1
M
; i = B;G.
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equilibrium. Similarly, for very small markets (i.e. low M), a rather high level
of negative or positive market externality (i.e. high jkj) is compatible with the
standard least cost separating equilibrium.7
4 Welfare Analysis
4.1 Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Information
We have previously learned from Spences model that all signaling is social
waste, since it has no e¤ect on productivity, and its only purpose is to facilitate
separation of types under asymmetric information. Therefore, under symmetric
information when both the rm and the worker know the productivity of the
latter, there is no incentives to signal, and the worker is paid according to his
known productivity. Clearly then welfare is higher under symmetric information
than under asymmetric information.
Does the introduction of market externalities change this clear-cut result?
We will argue that it does, and next we develop our claim that under certain
conditions, the welfare may actually be higher under asymmetric information
with signaling than in the case of symmetric information without signaling.
That is, in our set up society as such would in fact prefer private information
about workers types not be revealed immediately to employers. Rather, the
private information about workerstypes should be revealed via signaling.
To understand this result recall that in our model the signaling activity has
both negative and positive welfare e¤ects. The e¤ort is costly and as such a
loss just as Spence already pointed out. However, the signaling activity in our
paper creates as a by-product a good that will be freely available for consumers,
and clearly this is valuable for the society. We compare next welfare between
symmetric information and asymmetric information with signaling, and derive
exact conditions for the latter to be higher.
Consider rst the case of asymmetric information. When the rm employs
the "good" type, the social welfare, measured as the net of market surplus (see
appendix) and cost of signaling, is in the case of a complement, k > 0,
7 It is worthwhile to notice that for example in the software industry the market size e¤ects
can be huge. For instance, Apache web server is used in 63% of the worlds over 100 million
webserves.
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WC =
3
2
M (2 + kyG) 
yG
2
: (4)
And in the case of a substitute, k < 0;the welfare is equal to
WS =
3
2
M

2  1
3
kyG

  yG
2
: (5)
From earlier we know that in the case of substitute goods, the rms prot and
thus wages are decreasing in the level of signaling credential but the welfare
as captured by (5) is increasing in k: This is simply because some consumers
acquire the freely available good instead of buying the commercial good.
Under symmetric information, both the rm and the worker know the pro-
ductivity of the worker, and the worker is paid according to his productivity.
The rm then just employs the "good" type and develops a good that yields a
welfare of W  = 3M , which is the sum of the rms prot paid as wage (2M)
and the consumer surplus. Thus we can express our main claim as follows
Proposition 6 Welfare under asymmetric information with signaling is higher
than under symmetric information when either k <   1M or k > 13M :
Proof. Consider rst the case of substitutes when k < 0: In this case
we know that yG =
M
1 Mk :What we want show is that WS(yG) > W
: After
plugging yG into WS we can develop the inequality to hold as long as k <   1M :
Similarly, in the case of complements when 0 < k  12M we know that yG =
M
1 Mk : Now we want to derive the condition forWC(yG) > W
:Once yG =
M
1 Mk
is substituted in WC , we see that the inequality holds when k > 13M : From the
main analysis we know that if the externality is any higher, ymax > yG is chosen,
and thus k > 13M holds trivially.
To get intuition for the results notice that if the freely available good - that
is appearing as a by-product of the signaling activity - is a strong substitute
with k <   1M or a strong complement with k > 13M , the product market impact
of signaling is so strong that the additional welfare accruing to the rm as prot
and thus to the worker as wage and to the consumers as increased surplus ex-
ceeds the cost of the individual worker from engaging in the signaling activity.
To understand somewhat asymmetric e¤ects of substitutes and complements
in the welfare comparison one has to notice that in the case of substitutes the
externality e¤ect reduces the wages the "good" type earns, which in welfare cal-
culation is compensated in terms of increased consumer surplus. Once the freely
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available good becomes stronger substitute the latter e¤ect starts to dominate,
and for that reason the absolute level of threshold value of jkj is higher in the
case of substitutes than it is in the case of complements. Notice nally that
when the freely available good is a complement, the wage of the "good" type
and welfare are both increasing in k:
4.2 Too Much or Too Little signaling?
In section 3.1 we already mentioned briey that there may be a conict of inter-
est between privately and socially optimal levels of signaling under asymmetric
information. In this section we develop this point further, and derive the con-
ditions under which the private market solution may involve too little or too
much signaling compared to the level chosen by the welfare maximizing social
planner.
In what follows is the analysis of how the workers and the social planners
choice of signaling activity compare. To provide a complete comparison of the
privately and socially optimal levels of signaling under asymmetric information
we consider all the possible levels of externalities i.e.  1 < k < 1. Before
explaining in detail our ndings, it is useful to summarize our ndings as follows:
Proposition 7 Once comparing privately and socially optimal levels of signal-
ing we nd that (i) for k <   1M private market solution involves too little
signaling, (ii) for   1M  k < 13M private market solution involves too much
signaling, (iii) for 13M  k < 12M private market solution involves too little
signaling,(iv) for 12M  k < 1M private and socially optimal levels of signaling
coincide, and (v) for k  1M private market solution involves excess signaling.
Proof. To prove point (i) notice that welfare is increasing in the level of
signaling, and thus the social planner prefers the highest possible credential
ys. However, the "good" types individual rationality (IR) constraint, UG =
M (2 + ky)   y2  0 puts the upper limit for such ys. In fact, it must be
that yS  2M1
2 Mk
. Now given that k < 1M ; we see immediately that such
yS > yG = M1 Mk that is the private market solution involves too little signaling.
To prove (ii) it is enough to recall from previous section that when   1M <
k < 13M equations (4) and (5) reach a maximum with y = 0: On the other hand
we know from section 3.1 that the privately optimal solution yG = M1 Mk is valid
here, and thus the private market solution involves clearly too much signaling.
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To see point (iii) we know from section 3.1 that the privately chosen level
of signaling yG =
M
1 Mk : However, from the social point of view this is too low,
since the welfare is increasing in y, and thus the social planner would choose
ymax: That is, the private market solution involves too little signaling.
Under point (iv) when 12M < k <
1
M we know from section 3.2 that the
privately chosen level of signaling yG = ymax: Since welfare is increasing in y
the social planner would choose the highest possible level of signaling as well
i.e. yG = y
s = ymax:
To see point (v) notice that when k > 1M , the private market solution in-
volves yB = yG = ymax compared to yG = ymax that would be chosen by the
social planner. That is, the private market solution involves excess signaling,
since also the "bad" type will choose ymax:
To get some further economic intuition for the above results, and for why
there may exist a conict it is useful to recall that when choosing the level of
signaling the worker takes only into account that the signaling activity a¤ects
the rms revenue and thus the wages paid out. The worker does not take into
account any of those welfare e¤ects that accrue to consumers in the form of
consumer surplus from the freely available complementary or substitute goods.
These welfare e¤ects are, of course, valued by the social planner, and thus it is
rather clear that in most cases the privately chosen and socially optimal levels
of signaling do not coincide. In fact this simple reasoning is valid in points (i) -
(iv). The nal point is simply due to the duplication of signaling activities, and
the signaling activity of the "bad" type is there simply a social waste.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have extended Spences classical job market signaling model into
the situation where the signaling activity itself creates interesting externality
e¤ects that are coming through product markets. In particular, we advocated
the idea where a freely available good will appear as a by-product of signaling
activity. The free good can either be a substitute or a complement to the
commercially produced good, and it is the interaction between the goods in the
product market, that will be reected in the signaling behavior of individual
workers.
When externalities are either negative (substitute goods) or not too strong
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positive (complementary goods) the analysis of signaling and the derivation
of the least cost separating equilibrium of the signaling game was shown to
follow standard methods. It was pointed out that in the least cost separating
equilibrium the credential level that separates the "good" type from the "bad"
type with negative (positive) externality is lower (higher) than in the case when
externalities are absent.
Interestingly, we showed that the least cost separating equilibrium is quite
di¤erent than previously analyzed in the literature when we consider moderately
strong positive market externalities. In particular, we proved that there exists a
least cost separating equilibrium, where the "bad" type chooses zero credential
but where the "good" type chooses the maximum credential. Finally, in the
case complementary goods and very strong market externalities it was shown
that the signaling game has a pooling equilibrium with maximum signaling.
Finally, we also showed that under certain conditions the private market
solution may involve too little or too much signaling compared to the social
optimum. This result is simply due to the fact that individual workers and
rms do not internalize all the benets and costs of signaling that are however
valued by the welfare maximizing social planner. Interestingly, we also showed
that the social welfare may actually be higher under asymmetric information
with signaling than in the case of symmetric information, when there is no
reason to signal in the rst place.
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6 Appendix: Derivation of Revenue Functions
and Welfare
The market model used in this paper is based on Mustonen (2003, 2004) where
the author uses it to model interaction between commercial and free open source
programs in the consumer market for computer software.
At the outset we assume that there exist 4M consumers who di¤er only in
their willingness to pay for the goods, M is the measure of market size. When
only the rms commercial good is available (k = 0), consumersvaluation of
it are evenly distributed on the interval [0; ]. If the signaling activity has
resulted in a free complement to the rms good (k > 0), consumers valuation
of the rms good is increased and are on the interval [0;  + ky] : Finally, if
the signaling activity produces as by-product a free substitute good ( k < 0),
consumersvaluations of the commercial good are on the interval [0; ] and the
valuations of the freely available good are on the interval [0; ky]. We assume
that that the freely available good is an incomplete substitute to the commercial
good i.e.  ky < ;and that the ratio of valuations is equal for all consumers.
In the case of independent goods, the marginal consumers net valuation
of the rms commercial good is zero, Vm   p = 0, where Vm is the marginal
consumers valuation of the rms good, and p stands for the price of it. The
distribution of willingness to pay of consumers implies that the number of con-
sumers that have a higher willingness to pay than Vm is equal to  Vm 4M .
Maximization of prot function p

 p
 4M

yields the optimal price 2 and out-
put 2M: In the case of complements, the consumersvaluations are increased
compared to the preceding case. Now the number of consumers with a willing-
ness to pay higher than Vm is
(+ky) Vm
+ky 4M . Analogously, the optimal price
is +ky2 and output 2M: Signaling activity may also create a substitute to the
rms commercial good (k < 0), and in that case the rm has to take into
account the competing freely available good. The surpluses of the marginal
consumer when consuming the rms commercial good or the freely available
good have to be equal, Vm p = Vmf  0; where Vmf is the marginal consumers
valuation of the free good. We know that VmVmf =

 ky . Developing the marginal
condition yields Vm = p +ky : As in the case of independent goods, the number
of consumers with higher willingness to pay for the rms commercial good than
Vm is  Vm 4M: After substitution, prot maximization yields the same optimal
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price +ky2 and output 2M: We can thus conclude that in our analysis we can
simply use the reduced form revenue function M ( + ky), where k Q 0:
It is useful and important to notice that the market model used in above is by
no means the only one that will generate the derived revenue function. Consider
for instanceM homogeneous consumers with utility functions U = V  p, where
V is the value of the rms commercial good to the consumer. When a freely
available good is independent V = : In the case of a complement, the value
is V =  + ky: The optimal price is thus in both cases p =  + ky. If the
freely available good is a substitute, then there are two goods for consumers to
choose from with values V =  and Vf =  ky. The rm has to set the price
in such a way that consumers prefer the commercial good i.e. V   p  Vf   0.
The optimal price is again p =  + ky, and the revenue function in all cases is
M ( + ky).
Let us go back to the case considered rst and calculate the expression for
the welfare in the product market, which is measured as a sum of rms prot
and consumer surplus. In the case of independent goods, the social welfare is
simplyWi = 32M. With a freely available complementary good, both prot and
consumer surplus are increased, and Wc = 32M ( + ky) : If the freely available
good is a substitute to the rms commercial good (k < 0), the sum of prot
and consumer surplus from the commercial good is equal to that in the case
of an independent good. However, those consumers who do not buy the rms
commercial good, acquire the freely available good and enjoy the consumer
surplus from it, and thus Ws = 32M
 
   13ky

. In the following picture the
welfare is expressed in both cases.
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Figure 1: Welfare in the case of complementary and substitute goods.
21
References
[1] Cho, I-K and D. Kreps 1987: Signaling in Games and Stable Equilibria,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 102. 179-221.
[2] Hann I., Roberts J., Slaughter S. and Fielding R., 2002: Delayed Returns
to Open Source Participation: An Empirical Analysis of the Apache HTTP
Server Project, Graduate School of Industrial Organization, Carnegie Mel-
lon University, mimeo.
[3] Leppämäki, M. and M. Mustonen 2004: Signaling and Screening with Open
Source Programming. Helsinki School of Economics, Working Papers.
[4] Mustonen M., 2003: Copyleft - The Economics of Linux and Other Open
Source Software. Information Economics and Policy, 15(1), 99-122.
[5] Mustonen M. 2004: When Do Firms Support The Development of Substi-
tute Copyleft Programs? Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,
forthcoming.
[6] Riley, J. 1979: Informational Equilibrium, Econometrica 47. 331-360.
[7] Riley, J. 2001: Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and signal-
ing. Journal of Economic Literature XXXIX. 432-478.
[8] Spence, M. 1973: Job Market Signaling, Quarterly Journal of Economics
87. 355-74.
[9] Spence, M. 1974: Market Signaling, Harvard University press, Cambridge,
USA.
[10] Spence, M. 2002: Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure
of Markets. American Economic Review 92. 434-459.
[11] Stern, S. 1999: Do Scientists Pay to Be Scientists? NBER Working Paper
7410.
22
